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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
had a right to rely on the contractor's warning his men of the dan-
gerous nature of the compound, but if the shipowner knew that the
men had actually not been told, or if the evidence established facts
which would have led a reasonable man to inquire, there was never-
theless then a concurrent duty on the shipowner to advise contrac-
tor's workers. Here, then, even though the duty was based sub-
stantially on the doctrine of a supplier of dangerous chattels,' 2 the
duty was nevertheless made contingent upon knowledge that the
contractor had not himself taken proper precautions. In the present
case the court did not go into the question of whether or not the
shipowner knew that the men had not been warned.
It may be that the doctrine of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki'3
could be extended to cover this situation. There it was held that
longshoremen are seamen in the sense that a shipowner owes them
the duty of furnishing a seaworthy ship. "Where there is a failure
in the discharge of the obligation of seaworthiness, liability follows
regardless of negligence," 14 so that this is actually a form of lia-
bility without fault. This doctrine is novel and has not been inter-
preted to any great extent as yet. It may be the courts will construe
the duty upon shipowners towards stevedores to be an absolute duty
regardless of any concurrent duty or knowledge in other connected
parties. On the other hand, one of the reasons offered by the court
for adopting this view was that the contractor in that case had neither
the right nor opportunity to discover or remove the cause of peril.
A. G. K.
TORTS-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF TEMPORAL DAMAGES IS
CAUSE OF ACTION- REQUIRES LEGAL JUSTIFICATION BY DEFEN-
DANTS.-The Advance Music Corporation is engaged in the business
of publishing musical compositions. Deriving its income from sales
of sheet music to the general public, music jobbers, motion picture
studios, etc., it advertises extensively to promote the popularity of
its songs. Sheet music is handled on a consignment basis by jobbers
and premature return means severe loss of business to the plaintiff.
The defendants, the American Tobacco Company and an advertising
concern, are creators of a weekly commercial radio program with a
widespread audience, which program is known as "Your Hit Parade"
and which purports to present the ten most popular songs of the
week. The defendants also circulate weekly lists of these songs
12 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
13328 U. S. 85, 90 L. ed. 809 (1946).




among dealers, jobbers and the general public calculated to cause
them to rely on their representations that these songs are the best
ten of the week. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' choice is not the
result of an accurate nationwide survey as claimed by them, but is
capricious and willful, and it alleges further that plaintiff's songs are
not given their proper place on the program, all of which has caused
serious damage to the plaintiff's business.
Advance Music Corporation alleged three separate causes of ac-
tion against the defendants. The first cause of action was instituted
to obtain an injunction against the continuance of the radio program.
The second cause of action was for damages for injuries to plaintiff's
business which resulted from the intentional and wanton conduct of
the defendants in making fraudulent, false, and malicious statements
which constituted a deception of the public. The third cause of ac-
tion demanded damages as a result of the negligent misrepresenta-
tions of the defendants. The original complaint had been dismissed
by the Supreme Court as not stating a sufficient cause of action. The
opinion caused a dismissal of a federal court case,' which stated the
same complaint, on the basis of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
2
An amended complaint stating the aforesaid three causes of action
was thereupon submitted to the Supreme Court and was upheld as
sufficient in that it stated intent to injure the plaintiff; that it was
clear that the defendants' acts were likely to and had caused actual
damage 'to the plaintiff, and that although plaintiff and defendants
were not in competition, they were competing with each other in
creating the belief that certain particular songs are popular. 3 Defen-
dants appealed to the Appellate Division, which reversed the Supreme
Court decision and dismissed the amended complaint. 4  The court
stated that the first cause of action could not be upheld since it is a
well-settled rule in New York that in the interests of freedom of
speech, equity will not intervene to enjoin the disparagement of
property.5 The second cause of action was also insufficient because
the injury was to the general public and plaintiff could not sue on
its behalf, and plaintiff itself was not deceived nor had it taken action
in reliance upon the allegedly false representations made by the de-
fendants. The third cause of action for negligent misrepresentations
gave no basis for relief, because of the failure to allege and prove
that the defendants were under a duty to the plaintiff to act with
care and that the plaintiff had acted upon the statements to its
I Remnck Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F. Supp. 475 (S. D.
N. Y. 1945).
2 304 U. S. 64, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
3 Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 183 Misc. 855, 51
N. Y. S. (2d) 692 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
4 Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 268 App. Div. 707,
53 N. Y. S. (2d) 337 (1st Dep't 1945).
5 Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902).
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damage.8 The Appellate Division also pointed out that failure to
prove special damages in the second and third causes of action would
be fatal to the maintenance of the actions.7 Plaintiff thereupon ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals. Held, judgment of Appellate Divi-
sion reversed and order of Special Term affirmed. Advance Music
Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N. Y. 79, 70 N. E. (2d) 401
(1946).
The Court of Appeals sustained the second cause of action on
the ground that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal
damages is a cause of action which requires legal justification if the
defendants are to escape. The court did not decide whether the com-
plaint stated any other separate cause of action. Since it is a re-
viewing court, it was not necessary for it to determine the nature
of the judgment to which the plaintiff might be entitled.s
The legal concept that an action will lie for knowingly and in-
tentionally and without reasonable justification injuring another's
business is not a new one. It appears in Skinner & Co. v. Shew
& Co.,9 a patent infringement case, which pointed out that at com-
mon law there was a cause of action and damages would be recover-
able whenever a person did damage to another willfully without just
cause or excuse. This class of action included trade libel, which
applies to the main case. The English court went further than the
court in the instant case in declaring that even if actual damage had
not yet occurred, but was likely to do so, chancery would prevent
the wrongful action by injunction. The rule that willful harm is
actionable if the defendant does not justify his conduct, as a matter
of substantive law, no matter what the form of pleading, was adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in a conspiracy case 10 and
was made New York law in two subsequent cases. Both New York
cases are labor cases which hold that the immunity of labor unions
from legal responsibility does not include harm done to another or
to the public unless the acts bear a reasonable relation to the lawful
benefits which the unions are seeking.11
By accepting this rather bold and broad proposition, the court
has come away from the theory that there is no cause of action ex-
cept under some accepted heading of tort liability. The law of torts
is not static. The novelty of an action for which no direct precedent
6 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
7 Reporters' Assn. v. Sun Printing & Pub. Assn., 186 N. Y. 437, 79 N. E.
710 (1906).8 N. Y. RuLyis oF Civ. PRAc., 106.
9 1 Ch. 413 (1893).
20 Aikens v. State of Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 49 L. ed. 154 (1904).
2 Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349
(1941); American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N. Y. 226, 36
N. E. (2d) 123 (1941).
[ VOL. 21
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exists will not operate as a bar to legal remedy.12 Every form of
action when brought for the first time has no precedent to support
it, but this lack of precedent does not exclude a remedy for the
wrong complained of since the court will adapt its machinery to
sustain recovery on legal principles clearly applicable to the new
state of facts.' 3
That the defendants must show greater legal interest in them-
selves in order to avoid liability for intentional damage to another's
business has been shown in several New York cases. One of these
concerned competing businesses and it was held that since the de-
fendant had a legal right to engage in disadvantageous competition,
his acts were not actionable even if malicious motives were also
shown. 14 If the acts of the defendant are no more than an honest
defense of its own business, litigation can not be maintained. 1 Other
cases extended this theory beyond competing businesses in stating
that labor unions interfering with another's business must prove
lawful labor objectives, or else discontinue their injurious activities.16
The court uses the term "temporal damages" which has its origin
in the personal slander cases of the early common law courts, which
did not want to encroach on the jurisdiction of the church over
defamation. Therefore the common law courts would not uphold an
action unless "temporal" or pecuniary damages, as opposed to
spiritual damage, were proven. Historically, the requirement of spe-
cial damages in trade libel cases stems from the same factor which
made their proof essential in the aforementioned personal slander
cases. 17 Up to the present time, the rule in New York with respect
to property disparagement or trade libel cases has been that special
damages must be proven, that is, that specific loss of sales and cus-
tomers be enumerated so that the defendant might be enabled to meet
the charge.13 This may have been a workable rule centuries ago
when businesses were small and local and it was comparatively simple
to ascertain specific customers lost. In our modern economy, how-
ever, with its far-flung business structures, the rule is objectionable
because of the apparent practical difficulties in setting forth actual
customers and sales lost. The tendency in other jurisdictions has
been that a general allegation of disparagement and consequent loss
of business is enough to sustain a cause of action.19 The court does
12 Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N. Y. 176, 44 N. E. 773 (1896).
'3 Keller v. Butler, 246 N. Y. 249, 158 N. E. 510 (1927).
14 Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203 (1923).
25 Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 293 N. Y. 604, 59 N. E. (2d)
424 (1944).
16 Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941);
American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N. Y. 226, 36 N. E. (2d)
123 (1941).
17 Note, 41 ILL. L. RFv. 662 (1947).
18 Reporters' Assn. v. Sun Printing & Pub. Assn., 186 N. Y. 437, 79 N. E.
710 (1906).
19 Black & Yates v. Mahogany Assn., 129 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 3d 1942).
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not discuss the measure of damages, but since it stated that the sec-
ond cause of action was a good one, it can be implied that the failure
to allege specific customers and sales lost is not a bar to recovery,
actual damage having been shown by a general decline of business.
The court has made forward strides in providing a remedy for
a just complaint which could be fitted into no particular tort heading.
Instead of barring recovery and consigning this action to the ranks
of dainium absque injuria, the court applied a broad legal principle
to a new set of facts, giving legal redress where it was badly needed,
and considering justice rather than the narrow interpretation of legal
principles which have not grown with our economy.
H. P.
WILLS - CONDITIONS TENDING TO DISRUPTION oF DoMEsTIc
RELATIONS-PUBLIC PoLIcy.-The motion made by appellants, is to
take testimony before trial as to the motive and purpose of the tes-
tatrix in Articles Seventh and Eighth of her will. The proceeding
in which the trial is to be had and for which the examination is sought
is for determination of the validity of said articles of the will.
Article Seventh creates a trust and gives the income for life to
the testatrix's son and, upon his death, gives the principal to his
widow and issue other than his then wife or issue of said wife, and
provides that if there be no such widow or issue the principal is to
be distributed among several charities. Article Eighth expresses the
"purpose and will that under no circumstances shall any portion of
my estate" be paid to the then wife of the testatrix's son or any issue
of said wife.
Appellants, being the son and disinherited wife and issue, attack
these provisions of the will as being against public policy in that tes-
tatrix's purpose was to induce the son to divorce his wife. Appel-
lants state that the evidence they propose to elicit from the witnesses
sought to be examined before trial will disclose such purpose on the
part of testatrix. Held, denial of motion affirmed. The intention of
the testatrix, whatever it may have been, is immaterial because the
will does not tend to induce a divorce and is thus not contrary to
public policy. The testimony sought is, therefore, inconsequential.
Mr. Justice Callahan and Mr. Justice Glennon dissented on pro-
cedural grounds. Matter of Rothchild's Will, - App. Div. -, 66
N. Y. S. (2d) 573 (1st Dep't 1946).
A condition attached to a legacy, the evident purpose of which
was to induce the legatee to secure a divorce, is void in contraven-
tion of good morals and public policy.1 However, to offend public
1 Cruger v. Phelps, 21 Misc. 265, 47 N. Y. Supp. 61 (Sup.. Ct. 1897).
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